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When Oberon squeezes the juice of the flower onto the sleeping Titania’s 
eyelids in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, does this affect the way in which she 
comprehends Bottom when she beholds him upon waking up, or does it affect 
what it is like for her to look at him? Is there a difference? The question 
suggests that there are two ways of conceiving of a metaphor such as “seeing 
the world through rose-tinted glasses.” When the colouring of emotion is 
conceived of as a form of looking, the metaphor resonates with the sense in 
which we think of emotion as colouring the world by imbuing our perception 
of it with some new phenomenological tone. The colouring metaphor can also 
take the form of comprehending the object in a new way, so that putting on the 
metaphorical rose-tinted glasses affects how we make sense of our experience 
of the world. It seems that in different contexts our intuitions support both 
ways of thinking about the metaphor of emotion’s colouring. But how are we 
to unpack the metaphor? And when it is unpacked, which intuition does it 
provide theoretical support for? 
Richard Wollheim’s aesthetics and moral psychology involve him 
investigating different ways in which emotion colours our experience of the 
world. Wollheim, an Anglo-American analytic philosopher of the post-World 
War II generation, offers theories of art and emotion informed by the 
hypotheses of psychoanalysis. In On the Emotions, he conceives of emotion’s 
colouring our experience of the world as a way of comprehending.1 In Painting 
as an Art, however, he conceives of emotion colouring our experience in terms 
of a change in phenomenology.2 So a study of Wollheim’s philosophy might 
provide explanations for our two intuitions. In proposing such a study, I am 
interested in drawing out two implicit conceptions of the colouring metaphor 
rather than the concept of emotion that enables him to develop these 
conceptions. Even if the theory of mind that supports his approach to emotion 
is ultimately untenable, a recital of it will be useful in order to appreciate how 
he arrives at two conceptions of emotional colouring, conceptions which I shall 
suggest that any acceptable theory of emotion ought to explain. 
 
                                               
Damien Freeman is a Temporary Lecturer at Pembroke College, Cambridge. 
1 Richard Wollheim, On the Emotions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 
2 Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
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Philosophy of Emotion 
There has been much written in analytic philosophy about the nature of the 
emotions since William James’s famous Mind article argued that emotions are 
nothing more than our awareness of bodily changes.3 This was the first of the 
‘non-cognitive’ theories in the modern debate about emotion. It invited 
numerous responses from theorists who reject the idea that emotion is a purely 
somatic phenomenon. And so a range of cognitive theories appeared in the 
literature in response to James. Emotions were analysed in terms of beliefs and 
desires,4 as feelings,5 and as evaluative judgments.6 The non-cognitivist 
approach did not go into retreat, however, having been given a boost by 
neuroscience, which seemed to provide the empirical evidence required for a 
less crude theory than James had initially offered.7 
This literature gives the impression that one must choose between 
providing a cognitive theory of emotion or a non-cognitive theory. One thing 
that now seems clear, however, is that an emotion is a complex phenomenon 
that involves a number of cognitive and non-cognitive components.8 Even 
James can be read as acknowledging this in The Principles of Psychology.9 As 
Jesse Prinz has recently explained in Gut Reactions, the challenge for a 
contemporary theory is to find a way to incorporate the different components, 
whilst still explaining what is essential for regarding something as an 
emotion.10 This is not a new discovery. Aristotle observed in the Rhetoric that 
                                               
3 William James, ‘What is an Emotion?’, Mind, vol. IX (1884), pp. 188-205. 
4 Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (New York: Double 
Day, 1977) and Robert M. Gordon, The Structure of the Emotions: Investigations in 
Cognitive Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
5 Michael Stocker and Elizabeth Hegeman, Valuing Emotions (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) and Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
6 Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
7 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (New 
York: Putnam, 1994). 
8 For a survey of recent approaches to emotion in analytic philosophy see Robert C. 
Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
9 William James, Principles of Psychology (New York: Holt, 1890). In On the Emotions, 
Wollheim argues that commentators have misinterpreted James’s position by addressing 
only his account of emotion in Chapter XXV rather than reading this with Chapter XXIV on 
instinct. Wollheim thinks that James’s position is only properly understood when both 
chapters are read together: see Wollheim, On the Emotions, pp. 118-128. 
10 Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). Chapter 1 introduces his Problem of Parts and Problem of Plenty to 
which his proposed theory of embodied appraisals is offered as a solution. 
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“the emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their 
judgments, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure.”11 The Aristotelian 
formula still provides us with a working definition of emotion: any theory that 
does justice to our experience of emotions will have to say something about the 
sense in which they affect our judgments, and the sense in which they are 
attended by pleasure or pain. 
Aristotle’s approach to emotion in the Rhetoric has been taken up by 
two contemporary philosophers working in Wollheim’s tradition, each of 
whom develops a different component of the definition. In Love and its Place 
in Nature, Jonathan Lear develops the first component and discusses the sense 
in which emotion can affect our perception of the world by providing a 
framework through which we interpret our experience.12 In contrast, Malcolm 
Budd sketches out, in Music and the Emotions, a possibility for how we might 
understand the second component to affect our perception of the world by 
imbuing it with different kinds of pleasure or pain.13 
In the course of his interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis, Lear 
proposes a theory of emotion as a framework through which we view the 
world. This is offered as a means of explaining theoretically Freud’s clinical 
observations.14 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses the influence of emotion on 
reasoning.15 Lear develops this into “a framework through which the world is 
viewed.”16 This framework, or “orientation to the world,”17 is conceptually 
distinct from a feeling or bodily response which may also be part of the 
emotion. It is an attempt to make sense of these as well as beliefs, desires and 
phantasies. Making sense of oneself and one’s relationship to the environment 
need not be an entirely rational process: it may, for instance, involve 
                                               
11 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1378 a20. 
12 Jonathan Lear, Love and its Place in Nature (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1990). 
13 Malcolm Budd, Music and the Emotions (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985). 
14 Lear offers an interpretation of the development of emotion in Freudian theory and 
practice. In particular, he charts the development of emotion from a quantitative conception 
through to emotion conceived as an orientation to the world. The first position is spelt out in 
Freud’s early theoretical writing. The final position emerges gradually through his practice. 
Lear is in search of a theoretical account of the final position which Freud arrives at in 
practice, but not theory. Drawing on Aristotle, Lear develops a theoretical structure to 
explain the position at which he believes Freud finally arrives. This allows Lear to develop 
his own conception of emotion drawing both on Aristotle and Freud. See, Lear, Love and its 
Place in Nature. 
15 Aristotle, Rhetoric, II.1, 1377b31-1378a5. 
16 Lear, Love and its Place in Nature, p. 47. 
17 Lear, Love and its Place in Nature, p. 49. 
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phantasy.18 There are two key ideas that we can take from Lear’s conception of 
attitude as a framework. First, he develops Aristotle’s idea that emotion affects 
our judgments about the world into something through which we experience 
the world. Secondly, he takes from Freud a cognitive understanding of how the 
framework conditions the way we see the world. It affects the way we 
experience the world by introducing a claim to rationality, however, irrational 
that claim might be. It consists in ordering how we experience the world and 
brings with it the claim that this is the right way to make sense of the 
experience.  
Budd suggests that a variation in kinds of pleasure or pain may be 
introduced as one means of understanding the emotions.19 He starts with 
Aristotle’s idea that an emotion is a particular kind of thought plus “a positive 
or negative reaction to the content of the thought: a form of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction, pleasure or pain, agreeableness or disagreeableness, delight or 
distress”.20 He suggests emotion might involve “differences in kinds of 
pleasure which are not a matter of differences in the kinds of thought the 
pleasures involve”.21 According to this conception, an emotional state is not 
characterised by the presence of some unique thought-content alone. Rather, 
what is characteristic of the mental state is the particular variety of pleasure or 
pain. Budd gives a characterisation of fear as an example: “Fear is not merely 
distress at the thought of possible harm, but a particular kind of distress at the 
thought of possible harm.”22 If we accept that each form of emotion involves a 
particular form of pleasure or pain not differentiated by the thought that is 
found pleasing or painful, then we must conceive of pleasure and pain in terms 
of variations in the phenomenology of the pleasurable or painful states.23 
                                               
18 Lear, Love and its Place in Nature, p. 37. In speaking of ‘phantasy’ rather than ‘fantasy,’ I 
am following Wollheim’s usage of the psychoanalytic concept of ‘phantasy’ as unconscious 
mental activity that does not distinguish between reality and imagination, as opposed to the 
conscious activity of ‘fantasy,’ in which this distinction is made. 
19 Note that Budd does not endorse this approach. He concludes that his project does not 
require him to commit himself to a particular conception of emotion. 
20 Budd, Music and the Emotions, p. 5. 
21 Budd, Music and the Emotions, p. 11. 
22 Budd, Music and the Emotions, p. 12. 
23 Budd argues that if each emotion involves a different kind of pleasure or pain, this may or 
may not be a discrete component of the emotion. This would depend on whether the 
particular kind of pleasure that attends upon a particular emotion can be explained without 
reference to the emotion. If it could be, it would be a discrete concept. Alternatively, if the 
particular kind of pleasure could only be understood in terms of the emotion in the context 
of which it is experienced, then it can only be understood as a constituent of that emotion. 
This problem is not critical for us as either way there would be a variety of 
phenomenologies. See Budd, Music and the Emotions. 
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If, like Aristotle, we conceive of emotion as involving two 
components, we might regard Lear as offering the kind of account that we 
require of the first component and Budd as offering the kind of account that we 
require of the second component. The effect of Oberon’s flower on Titania 
would then be twofold: it would involve her perceiving Bottom through the 
lens of Lear’s framework and through the lens of Budd’s peculiar pleasure. Her 
experience might then be coloured in a different way by each lens. Wollheim’s 
philosophy, I suggest, can offer an account of how our experiences are 
coloured differently by these two lenses. 
 
Wollheim’s Philosophy of Mind 
To understand how Wollheim conceives of emotion contributing to our 
practical life and aesthetic contemplation, we need to appreciate something of 
his approach to the philosophy of mind. This approach draws a fundamental 
distinction between mental states and mental dispositions. This is not a 
distinction between two ways of thinking about the same phenomena. It is a 
claim that our mental life involves the interaction between two different kinds 
of phenomena which are defined as follows: 
Mental states are those transient events which make up the lived part 
of the life of the mind, or, to use William James’s great phrase, ‘the 
stream of consciousness.’ They occur at a time, though the duration 
of a mental state seldom admits of precise determination…  
Mental dispositions are those more or less persisting modifications 
of the mind which underlie this sequence of mental states. They have 
histories, and these histories can vary greatly in length and in 
complexity.24 
Mental states and mental dispositions share three common properties: 
intentionality, or thought-content; grades of consciousness (they may be 
conscious, preconscious, or unconscious); and psychological reality.25 A 
further property which mental states have, but which mental dispositions do 
not, is phenomenology. Mental states are the stream of events that form the 
lived part of our life. What it feels like for the subject to undergo an event, or 
to have the mental state, is its phenomenology. One way in which I shall 
suggest that a mental state can colour our perception of the world is by fusing 
                                               
24 Wollheim, On the Emotions, pp. 1-2. Wollheim takes from Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of 
Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949) the fundamental distinction between 
mental states and mental dispositions. Having adopted this distinction, he then proceeds to 
make entirely his own use of it. 
25 Wollheim, On the Emotions, pp. 4-8. This is what distinguishes him sharply from Ryle 
who takes dispositions to be tendencies which can be predicted, but not psychologically real 
mental phenomena. 
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with it. For Wollheim, mental dispositions cannot have phenomenology 
because they are not part of the stream of events that we undergo. They 
underlie this stream. It is for this reason that they are only ever experienced 
indirectly through the mental states in which they manifest themselves.26 It 
might be objected that Wollheim simply stimulates that mental dispositions do 
not have phenomenology.27 My purpose is not to defend this contentious claim. 
Rather, I am interested in how it enables him to develop one particular 
conception of emotional colouring.  
Wollheim distinguishes different kinds of mental dispositions from 
one another based on their different roles. The role of a disposition is the way it 
modifies the person.28 It might do this by constraining the possible mental 
states that the person can have; by reinforcing existing mental dispositions or 
initiating new ones; or regulating behaviour. These modifications might be 
achieved indirectly by a mental disposition manifesting itself in a mental state, 
but mental states themselves do not modify the person. Again, this might seem 
like a contentious claim, but what matters is to appreciate how it enables 
Wollheim to develop a second sense of colouring. The second way in which I 
shall suggest that a person’s experience of the world can be coloured, in 
Wollheim’s system, is by the way in which a mental disposition modifies the 
person’s experience. 
In On the Emotions, Wollheim firmly states that emotions are mental 
dispositions. In Painting as an Art, it seems that he treats them as mental states. 
In this article, I do not propose to enter into a debate about what kind of mental 
phenomenon emotion should be identified with. That is not required in order to 
understand emotional colouring. If Wollheim’s account of emotion can offer 
anything to the current investigation, it is the thought that our emotional life 
involves mental dispositions which colour the way we perceive the world, and 
which manifest themselves in different mental states; initiate other mental 
dispositions; and find expression in behaviour. All of this can be asserted 
without resolving whether the mental disposition that is the attitude in On the 
Emotions should be identified with the concept of emotion. 
                                               
26 Wollheim, On the Emotions, pp. 6-8. Note that Wollheim distinguishes between 
subjectivity and phenomenology; phenomenology being the fusion of subjectivity with 
intentionality. Because this distinction is not important for my purposes, I adopt the more 
general usage of phenomenology as the ‘what it is like’ although in Wollheim’s writing this 
is referred to as subjectivity. 
27 Indeed, it might further be objected that the lack of phenomenology is inconsistent with 
his own claim that mental dispositions are subject to three different grades of consciousness.  
28 Richard Wollheim, The Thread of Life (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 
1984), pp. 49-56. 
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For this reason, the major break with Wollheim that I propose is that, 
whilst we should retain his conception of a particular kind of mental 
disposition that colours the world, we should not identify this with emotion. 
Rather, we should conceive of emotion as an interaction between certain 
mental dispositions and mental states. Our emotional life is an economy or 
organized system of parts. The parts of that economy are the mental 
dispositions and mental states described by Wollheim, and they interact with 
each other in the ways he suggests. Whilst the idea of an emotional economy 
might seem like a claim about what an emotion is, it is more fundamentally a 
claim that emotion is to be identified with how particular mental dispositions 
and mental states interact rather than being identified with either the mental 
dispositions or the mental states. It does not need to succeed as an ontological 
claim about emotion. It is enough for an account of emotional colouring that it 
offers us a way of thinking about emotional experiences that takes account of 
both the mental dispositions and mental states as constituents of those 
experiences. 
I shall suggest that the nature of emotion as a mental disposition 
provides Wollheim with an explanation for why one component of emotion can 
colour experience by offering an interpretation of it. Similarly, the nature of 
emotion as a mental state provides an explanation for why another component 
of emotion can also colour experience by imbuing it with a distinctive 
phenomenology. If we conceive of emotion as a composite phenomenon that 
involves both a framework that affects our judgments, and as a distinctive form 
of pleasure or pain, then perhaps when Wollheim treats emotion as a mental 
disposition he is giving an account of the first component, and when he treats it 
as a mental state, he provides an account of the second component. Again, in 
suggesting this, I am not primarily concerned with establishing whether 
emotions are more fundamentally mental states or mental dispositions, or 
whether they necessarily involve both. Rather, I am primarily interested in the 
sense in which features that Wollheim ascribes to mental states and mental 
dispositions allow him to explain how emotions can colour our experience in 
different ways. 
 
Emotion and Practical Life 
The first sense of emotional colouring, cognitive colouring, is analysed in 
Wollheim’s On the Emotions. Wollheim’s project in this work is to provide an 
account of the role or function that emotion has in our psychology. He explains 
that emotion’s role is to provide “an orientation, or an attitude to the world … 
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emotion tints or colours it: it enlivens it or darkens it as the case may be.”29 So 
the task is to explain precisely what this tinting or colouring metaphor means. 
Wollheim provides an account of emotion as an attitude that colours our 
experience by memorializing the past in which the emotion originates. 
Characteristically, emotions originate in some desire. We perceive or 
imagine the desire to have been (or to be in prospect of becoming) satisfied or 
frustrated. Consciously or unconsciously, we ask ourselves how this 
satisfaction or frustration comes about and identify some person, thing, or fact 
which we take to precipitate the satisfaction or frustration of the desire. We 
develop an attitude towards that object. The attitude is usually either positive or 
negative and accordingly either attended by pleasure or unpleasure. The 
attitude persists and it manifests itself in various mental states, generates a 
variety of mental dispositions, finds expression in behaviour, and may 
indirectly generate action.30 
The attitude is at the core of the emotion. It is because we develop a 
particular attitude towards an object that certain mental states, dispositions, and 
behaviour follow and our lives take the course that they do. But what is it to 
perceive a person, fact, or thing through an attitude? We are told that the 
attitude develops when we shift our attention from thinking about a perceived 
or imagined experience of satisfaction or frustration of desire to thinking about 
the object that is perceived or imagined to have precipitated it. We focus on the 
person, thing, or fact that we have identified as the precipitating factor. We 
now experience this object in light of the satisfaction or frustration of desire 
that we previously perceived or imagined it to precipitate. This is experiencing 
the object through an attitude. 
Wollheim’s attitude is a particular way of characterizing Lear’s claim 
to rationality.31 The claim to rationality is an attempt by the archaic mind to 
make sense of itself and its relationship to its environment. It claims to be the 
correct framework through which to make sense of the world. Wollheim’s 
attitude is such a framework. Specifically, it is a framework constructed out of 
the experience of satisfaction or frustration of desire in the life that the 
individual has lived. It is the claim that the way to make sense of a particular 
person, fact, or thing, is in light of the satisfaction or frustration of desire that it 
is perceived or imagined to have precipitated.  
When Jay Gatsby kisses Daisy just once, he perceives his desire that 
he be loved exclusively to have been satisfied. His vivid imagination works 
                                               
29 Wollheim, On the Emotions, p. 15. 
30 Wollheim, On the Emotions, pp. 15-16. This is a summary of Wollheim’s nine-stage 
characteristic history. 
31 Wollheim cites Lear’s approach with approval: Wollheim, On the Emotions, p. 74, n. 7. 
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non-stop over the next five years and although he does not see her again during 
that time, he comes to comprehend her in light of the desire which he imagines 
that she has satisfied. He convinces himself that this transfiguration of the past 
is the right way to understand her: “No amount of fire or freshness can 
challenge what a man can store up in his ghostly heart.” He builds up a 
framework through which he makes sense of her, “decking it out with every 
bright feather that drifted his way.” This attitude to her becomes the – 
ultimately destructive – driving force in his life: he forms new beliefs, desires, 
takes action, changes his behaviour, all in response to how he comprehends 
her. That Gatsby’s love is able to modify the course his life takes in this way is 
due to the fact that emotion is a mental disposition. As a mental disposition, it 
possesses the capacity in Wollheim’s system to modify the course that the 
stream of consciousness takes.32 
When Wollheim discusses attitude, he is at pains to point out that 
although it involves comprehending the world, it is a matter of doing so 
through perception and imagination rather than belief and evaluation, just as 
the archaic mind’s attempt to be rational is said to involve an irrational form of 
rationality.33 Having established the sense in which attitude involves makes 
sense of the world, what matters from my perspective is a different distinction. 
We can contrast emotion as a way of trying to make sense through imagination 
and perception – a loosely cognitive activity, however irrational it may be – 
with emotion as a feeling that is not even in the broadest sense cognitive, a 
change in phenomenology. 
 
Emotion and Aesthetic Contemplation 
For Wollheim, the supreme achievement of painting as an art is that it enables 
the artist to explore his emotions through paint. When looking at a painting, the 
spectator is able to recreate this process of emotional investigation that 
terminated in the painted surface before which he stands. Such emotional 
investigation through engaging with a painted surface is possible because both 
artist and spectator possess the capacity for what Wollheim calls “expressive 
                                               
32 “Almost five years! There must have been moments even that afternoon when Daisy 
tumbled short of his dreams – not through her own fault, but because of the colossal vitality 
of his illusion. It had gone beyond her, beyond everything. He had thrown himself into it 
with a creative passion, adding to it all the time, decking it out with every bright feather that 
drifted his way. No amount of fire or freshness can challenge what a man can store up in his 
ghostly heart,”: F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (London: Bloomsbury Classics, 
1994), p. 97. 
33 Wollheim, On the Emotions, p. 77: “it is how the object is perceived or imagined – rather 
than how it is thought of or evaluated, which are the aspects that modern philosophers have 
emphasized – that is crucial to the formation of an emotion.” 
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perception.” Expressive perception is explained as a twofold experience in 
which a perceptual component fuses with an affective component to create an 
experience that is quasi-affective and quasi-perceptual.  
In his account of expressive perception, Wollheim offers an entirely 
different approach to how emotion colours the world, from that developed in 
On the Emotions. Expressive perception occurs when we perceive 
“correspondences.”34 Correspondence is a match between the appearance of 
some part of the world and an emotional condition of the perceiver. The 
tendency to find such correspondences can be traced to our earliest experiences 
of the world.35 The engine for correspondence is projection, a psychoanalytic 
defence mechanism through which a benefit is derived by imagining that 
psychological phenomena are physically expelled in archaic mental 
functioning.36 
What does it mean for an emotion to fuse with a perception, and in 
what sense might this colour our experience of the world? Wollheim tells us 
that fusing is not merely a matter of association, but of condensation of mental 
states, and when the states are condensed, the perception becomes saturated 
with the emotion: 
In the present case, the mental state integrates with the perception: 
and for this a parallel might be with the association of a colour to the 
sound of a vowel, where there is not mere association, there is also 
condensation. And secondly, the effect of the mental state integrating 
with the perception is that the mental state conditions how we 
perceive the landscape or what we perceive it as. Much as, though a 
colour could not affect how we think of a number, or could not 
                                               
34 Wollheim’s concept of correspondence combines the idea of correspondance in French 
symbolist poetic theory (which was itself influenced by the mystic philosopher, 
Swedenborg) with projection in psychoanalytic theory, which he regards as providing the 
basis for correspondence. 
35 In making such claims, Wollheim draws on the hypotheses of psychoanalysis and the 
evidence for these which the psychoanalysts claim to find in their clinical work. However, 
their claims remain contentious as does Wollheim’s use of them. For a critical evaluation of 
his position, see Malcolm Budd, ‘Wollheim on Correspondence, Projective Properties, and 
Expressive Perception’, in Richard Wollheim on the Art of Painting, ed. Rob van Gerwen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 101-111. 
36 In psychoanalysis, projection is a defence mechanism. Wollheim distinguishes between 
two forms of projection: simple projection and complex projection (e.g. Wolheim, Painting 
as an Art, pp. 82-84). He argues that in addition to its primary function as a defence 
mechanism, complex projection can generate projective properties which serve as the basis 
for expressive perception.  
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saturate our thought, we could come to hear, say, the vowel U as 
green.37 
The idea of an emotion merging with a perception could provide a basis for 
understanding how emotion can colour the world. But it seems to be a very 
different sense of colouring to the sense considered in the previous section. The 
condensing and merging that Wollheim speaks of seems to be a condensing 
and merging of phenomenologies. Just as colour-hearing synesthesia involves 
the integrating and merging of what a chord sounds like and what a hue looks 
like, so expressive perception involves the merging of what an emotion feels 
like with the phenomenology of a sense perception. Given Wollheim’s theory 
of mind, the emotional phenomenon this involves must be a mental state rather 
than a mental disposition. This is evident not merely from the fact that he refers 
to it in the passage cited as a mental state (he might have been using this term 
interchangeably with “mental phenomenon”), but because in his theory of 
mind, mental states, but not mental dispositions, possess phenomenology. 
What is it that Wollheim thinks fuses with the perception? Can it be 
the attitude that we have seen is at the core of his conception of emotion? The 
attitude, we have seen, is a framework through which we perceive an object, 
and which interprets the object in light of the past. How could a way of making 
sense fuse with a perception in the way that a colour might fuse with a sound? 
Evidently, Lear’s claim to rationality is not what Wollheim has in mind in this 
instance. Earlier, we considered the idea that the different emotions might each 
involve a unique kind of pleasure or pain. Can we conceive of a feeling of 
pleasure or pain fusing with a perception? If we can conceive of a colour 
fusing with a sound, then it seems that by analogy we might conceive of a 
feeling of pleasure or pain fusing with a sound, hue, or perception of a host of 
golden daffodils. So it seems to me that when Wollheim talks of emotions 
fusing in expressive perception, we should take him to be thinking of 
something like Budd’s distinctive kinds of pleasure and pain fusing with the 
perception.38 
The metaphor of colouring might be employed metaphorically to 
describe the effect of this merging. When an emotion fuses with a perception, it 
colours the perception. However, when the feeling of pleasure or pain fuses 
with the perception, this is not a matter of changing how we make sense of the 
perception. Rather, it changes something about the feeling of the perception by 
                                               
37 Richard Wollheim, ‘The Sheep and the Ceremony’, in his The Mind and Its Depths 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 5. 
38 Although there is no evidence that Wollheim conceives of different kinds of pleasure, he 
does say that pleasure or unpleasure usually attends an attitude: see Wollheim, On the 
Emotions, p. 95. 
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condensing the sense perception with the feeling of pleasure or pain. When 
Charlie Brown observes that nothing takes the taste out of peanut butter quite 
like unrequited love, he is not saying that unrequited love changes his attitude 
to peanut butter, or that he now makes sense of it in a new way (although this 
might also happen). What he means to draw our attention to is the change in 
the phenomenology of eating peanut butter when the particular kind of pain 
that attends unrequited love fuses with the taste of peanut butter. This change 
can be explained by Wollheim because he conceives of the emotional 
phenomenon that does the colouring as a mental state rather than a mental 
disposition. 
 
Wollheim’s Two Conceptions of Emotional Colouring 
What we have now is an account of two different ways in which emotion can 
colour the world. It can change the way we make sense of something, as Jay 
Gatsby’s attitude causes him to comprehend Daisy in light of the satisfaction of 
his desires which, he imagines, she brought about before and is capable of 
doing once again. It can also change the way we feel about something, as 
Charlie Brown’s feeling of unrequited love fuses with the taste of peanut butter 
to take the taste out of it. These are two different ways in which emotion 
colours our experience: it can be filtered by an attitude or by a feeling of 
pleasure or pain.  
I have endeavoured to show how Wollheim’s approach to emotion 
draws out the difference between these two forms of colouring because his 
theory involves two components: a mental state and a mental disposition. The 
mental disposition is a framework through which we comprehend the world, 
and the mental state is a feeling of pleasure or pain. When Wollheim provides 
an account of attitude, he explains how the first component of emotion can 
colour the world by convincing us that making sense of it in light of 
satisfaction or frustration of a certain desire is right. When he provides an 
account of expressive perception, he explains how the second component can 
colour the world in a different way, by fusing it with a feeling of pleasure or 
pain. If we approach Wollheim’s philosophy as addressing different 
components of emotion, then the features of the different kinds of mental 
phenomena involved in each case can account for the different ways in which 
these components are able to colour our experience of the world. 
It is through his exploitation of the differences between the properties 
of mental states and mental dispositions that he is able to articulate the 
different ways in which emotion as mental state and mental disposition is able 
to colour our experience. However, one might conclude that Wollheim does 
not provide compelling arguments for the claims that mental states but not 
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mental dispositions possess phenomenology, and that mental dispositions but 
not mental states have roles in our psychology. Even if we find his theory of 
mind unsatisfactory, we might still maintain that any satisfactory account of 
our emotional life would incorporate the two conceptions of colouring that he 
employs. 
In writing about the two different approaches to emotional colouring 
that we find in Wollheim’s philosophy, I have concentrated on love as an 
example, and endeavoured to show how love might colour our experience of 
the world in two different ways. This could equally have been applied to other 
emotions, however. Wollheim discusses the way loneliness and despair can 
fuse with our perception of an estuary, and so we might also consider how 
loneliness and despair might form a framework through which we perceive the 
world.39 Indeed, he discusses how a particular experience of frustration of 
desire might give rise to attitudes of despair, jealousy, regret, remorse, or 
sadness, depending upon the direction in which one’s thoughts turn.40 So we 
might consider how jealousy, regret, remorse, or sadness could fuse with 
perception in aesthetic contemplation, as well as forming a framework through 
which we attempt to make sense of our experience in practical life. So there is 
a wide range of emotions that might colour our experience in the ways that he 
suggests. However, these then to be the higher cognitive emotions. Where his 
approach is, admittedly, less convincing, is with the lower instinctive reactions, 
emotional impulses such as startle. 
 
Two Requirements of a Theory of Emotion 
Wollheim offers us an account of two different ways in which emotion can 
colour the world. The account of cognitive colouring is given as part of an 
explanation of the role the emotions play in our practical lives. The account of 
phenomenological colouring is found in his explanation of how our capacity 
for expressive perception contributes to aesthetic experience. It is not a co-
incidence that his full account of how emotion colours the world is spread 
across two separate spheres of enquiry: that emotion is capable of colouring 
our experience in different ways explains why it is able to make different 
contributions to different aspects of our lives. 
As a claim to rationality, or an attitude through which we attempt to 
comprehend the world, an emotion is able to initiate new mental states, 
generate other mental dispositions (including desires, and indirectly through 
these, actions), and modify behaviour. In all these ways, emotion has the 
ability to affect our practical lives by moving us on in life. But emotion also 
                                               
39 See Wollheim, Painting as an Art, p. 81. 
40 Wollheim, On the Emotions, p. 74. 
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has the ability to colour the world in another way that draws us back and pulls 
us into aesthetic contemplation. As a feeling of a particular kind of pleasure or 
pain, an emotion is able to change the phenomenology of our perception of the 
world by fusing with the perception. In this way, emotion intensifies our 
experiences in a way that enables them to sustain our interest without directly 
having any practical consequences. 
Charlie Brown is not going to be moved on in life one way or another 
simply because the pain of unrequited love fuses with the taste of peanut 
butter. Of course, he might also perceive the peanut butter through the lens of 
attitude, and this may well give rise to desires or aversions that affect the 
course that his life takes. Emotion provides two lenses through which Charlie 
Brown might perceive the peanut butter: the lens of the attitude of perceiving 
his love is unrequited, and the lens of the particular kind of pain that attends 
unrequited love. The consequences of perceiving the peanut butter through one 
lens or the other – or both – are different. Similarly, Jay Gatsby finds that in 
addition to the life-changing consequences that occur when he comprehends 
Daisy through the lens of a particular attitude, the distinctive bitter-sweet 
pleasure of his feelings for her fuses with the green light at the end of her dock 
on the other side of the bay. Looking into it gives rise to a particularly dense 
experience that draws him in and sustains his attention into the small hours of 
the night.  
Wollheim also shows us that the different ways of colouring our 
experience contribute to different aspects of our life. When Oberon anoints 
Titania’s eyelids with the juice of the flower, it may be that she comprehends 
Bottom in a new way, or it may be that the feeling of looking at him changes. 
Perhaps both occur. But we can distinguish two different forms of emotional 
colouring rather than merely two perspectives from which the same colouring 
phenomenon can be described. Love’s ability to change how Titania 
comprehends Bottom through the lens of an emotional attitude will have 
repercussions in Titania’s practical life. Love’s ability to fuse a particular 
feeling of pleasure with her perception of him might draw her into aesthetic 
contemplation of the donkey-masked Bottom. Wollheim was equally interested 
in emotion’s contribution to how we live our lives and how we appreciate art. 
He also understood that emotion makes different contributions in each case, 
both of which are important for human flourishing. 
In this article, I have argued that an account of the contributions of 
emotional colouring to different aspects of our life needs to begin with a 
conception of emotion that is expansive rather than constricted. I have 
suggested that Wollheim’s conception of emotions as involving dispositions 
that manifest themselves in mental states offers the kind of starting point 
The Lens of Emotion 
 
Literature & Aesthetics 20 (2) December 2010, page 88 
required for this purpose. The thriving contemporary literature on the definition 
of emotion has not featured in this account. This contemporary debate can be 
seen as a response to James’s theory of emotion. That debate takes James to 
identify the concept of emotion with the feeling of changes in bodily states. His 
critics then argue that this is the wrong mental phenomenon with which to 
identify emotion. An emotion is variously conceived of by them as a thought, a 
desire, a feeling, or a value judgement.41 In response to such cognitive 
conceptions of emotion, the neo-Jamesian positions reassert the claim that 
emotions are essentially somatic states.42 So the debate takes the form of 
arguing about whether emotion is essentially cognitive or somatic; and then if 
it is cognitive, what kind of cognitive phenomenon is it; and if it is somatic, 
how James’s approach needs to be revised to account for the cognitivists’ 
claims. The debate is further complicated by the claim that emotion is not a 
natural kind, but an umbrella term that incorporates a range of different 
phenomena. Theorists pick and choose which they will give an account of, 
depending upon the mental phenomenon in terms of which they choose to 
analyse emotion.43 
But the attempt to identify emotion with a particular kind of mental or 
somatic phenomenon flies in the face of common sense. For, if there is one 
thing that is generally accepted about the emotions, it is that they seem to 
involve a range of different phenomena. As we noted earlier, Aristotle long ago 
observed that the emotions are susceptible to analysis in terms of different 
phenomena: the dialectician will define anger in terms of something like a 
desire for revenge, whereas the natural philosopher will define it in terms of a 
                                               
41 For the various cognitivist accounts of emotion, see the landmark works on emotion in 
terms of belief and desire, see Solomon, The Passions; Gordon, The Structure of the 
Emotions; or as feeling, see Stocker and Hegeman, Valuing Emotions; Goldie, The 
Emotions; and for emotion as evaluative judgment, see Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought. A 
convenient survey of contemporary positions in analytic philosophy may be found in 
Solomon, Thinking About Feeling. 
42 For the most influential neo-Jamesian defences of emotion as a somatic phenomenon, see 
Ekman’s work on expression of basic emotions, e.g. Paul Ekman, ‘An Argument for Basic 
Emotions’, Cognition and Emotion, vol. 6 (1992), pp. 169-200; and Paul Ekman, Emotions 
Revealed (New York: Henry Holt, 2003); Lazarus’s appraisal theory, e.g. Richard S. 
Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and 
Damasio’s work in neurology, e.g. Damasio, Descartes’ Error. 
43 See Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1997) for an account of the deconstruction of emotion through a study of the life sciences 
and a distinct critique of the category of emotion through the history of philosophy in 
Amélie O. Rorty, ‘Aristotle on the Metaphysical Status of Pathe’, Review of Metaphysics, 
vol. 38 (1984), pp. 521-546; and Amélie O. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980). 
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boiling of the blood.44 The philosophical challenge is not a matter of deciding 
whether to side with the dialectician or the natural philosopher, but to work out 
how to provide an analysis of anger that accounts for its propensity to be 
understood both as a desire for revenge and a boiling of the blood.45 On this 
point, Aristotle and James are of like mind. James is aware of the need to 
explain both the dispositional and phenomenological aspects of an experience 
such as fear or anger. The error of the current debate now seems to be that 
rather than reading Chapters XXIV and XXV of The Principles of Psychology 
together, James’s interpreters have attended only to one aspect of his account 
and then assumed that their task is to assess whether this phenomenon – or 
some other one – is synonymous with the emotion. The debate between the 
contemporary cognitive theorists and neo-Jamesians is as ill-founded as a 
debate between the dialectician and the natural philosopher on anger, or an 
interpretation of fear exclusively in terms of James’s concept of instinct or his 
concept of emotion. 
Whatever the correct answer to the analytic question is, it is this 
broader approach that we have seen the current project demands. We are 
equally interested in investigating the different ways in which anger colours 
our experience of the world as a boiling of the blood, and as a desire for 
revenge. If the analytic theorists were able to conceptualize emotion in a way 
that enabled us to combine the various associated phenomena, a definition 
would not have to reduce emotion to a single mental phenomenon. In this case, 
the concept of emotion would be sufficiently broad to account for the different 
ways in which emotion’s constituent phenomena colour experience. Having 
surveyed the current literature, Jenefer Robinson argues that rather than 
choosing between the alternative pretenders to the title of emotion, the solution 
is to conceive of emotion as a process that involves all of these phenomena.46  
The process involves four components: an affective (i.e. non-
cognitive) appraisal which initiates an emotional response to an object; the 
bodily feelings thus initiated; cognitive monitoring of these responses; and 
emotional feelings. Robinson argues that once the emotion is identified with 
the process, we can see why any of the phenomena that comprise the response 
                                               
44 Aristotle, De Anima, 403 a2-403 b19. A translation may be found in J. Barnes (ed.), The 
Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), Vol. I, pp. 641-692. 
45 Aristotle’s treatment of the emotions is spread across the Rhetoric (see 1378 a20-1380 
a4), De Anima, and Nicomachean Ethics (e.g. 1125 b26-1126 b9). Translations of these texts 
may be found in Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. II, p. 2152ff and p. 1729ff 
respectively. 
46 Jenefer Robinson, Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, Music, and 
Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 59. 
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do not count as emotions if they are not initiated by the appropriate affective 
appraisals: such phenomena are not part of the process that constitutes the 
emotion. Likewise, an affective appraisal that has not initiated a response is not 
an emotion because, regarded as such, it is not yet a component of the process 
that is the emotion. Robinson’s approach explains why each of the theorists has 
hit on some truth about what emotion involves without having managed to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of it.47 
What are the affective appraisals that initiate the emotional response? 
Robinson identifies four ways in which they have been characterized in the 
scientific literature:48 the preference/aversion approach (e.g. Zajonc),49 in 
which the affective appraisal is identified with an innate preference or aversion 
to certain stimuli; the component approach (e.g. Scherer),50 which identifies the 
affective appraisal with a cluster of stimulus evaluations, some of which are 
present at birth and others of which develop; the goal-orientated approach (e.g. 
one reading of Lazarus),51 which identifies affective appraisals with the 
congruence or incongruence of the object with the promotion of a goal of the 
agent; and the basic emotion approach (e.g. an alternative reading of Lazarus), 
which identifies affective appraisals with the basic emotions that can be 
distinguished physiologically. Each of these meets with certain difficulties 
which mean that, in Robinson’s opinion, no one approach on its own can 
account for affective appraisals.  
It will be apparent that there is some similarity between the 
relationship between the affective appraisal and the somatic response in 
Robinson’s process and the relationship between the mental disposition and the 
mental state in Wollheim’s theory. The affective appraisal is said to initiate the 
response and the mental disposition manifests itself in a mental state. So it 
might be thought that the process theory could serve as a basis for 
understanding our intuitions about emotional colouring in the same way that 
Wollheim’s theory does. There is, however, an important reason for preferring 
Wollheim’s theory to Robinson’s. Whichever approach (or combination of 
approaches) to affective appraisals Robinson settles on, in no case will there be 
a diachronic aspect. The mental disposition that is Wollheim’s attitude is said 
                                               
47 For a similar proposal that combines cognitive and non-cognitive components in the form 
of an embodied appraisal rather than a process, see Prinz, Gut Reactions. 
48 Robinson, Deeper Than Reason, pp. 61-70. 
49 R.B. Zajonc, ‘Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences’, American 
Psychologist, vol. 35, no. 2 (1980), pp. 151-175; Sheila T. Murphy and R.B. Zajonc, 
‘Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective Priming with Suboptimal and Optimal 
Stimulus’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 64, no. 5 (1993), pp. 723-739. 
50 Klaus R. Scherer, Facets of Emotion: Recent Research (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1988). 
51 Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation. 
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to colour the world with the lens of the past. It can do this because the attitude 
has its origin in an earlier experience of satisfaction or frustration of desire 
which develops into the attitude through the characteristic history. In this way 
the attitude is a transfigured memorialization of the past. It is because the 
mental disposition has this diachronic dimension that it can provide a 
framework which enables Gatsby’s perception of Daisy to be coloured by his 
past. Because Robinson’s affective appraisals lack the diachronic dimension, 
they lack the ability to colour experiences in this way. For this reason, we 
should prefer the theory of emotional economy to the process theory. 
The utility of Wollheim’s approach to the nature of emotion for our 
understanding of emotional colouring suggests that we should either revisit his 
theory of emotion in order to refine it, or look to how we might revise another 
account of emotion in order to accommodate these insights into the different 
ways in which emotion contributes to our practical life and aesthetic 
contemplation by colouring our experience in different ways. 
 
 
